Your FY27 AI number locks in November. Right now it’s a guess.
unerr gives mid-market finance teams an FY27 AI number they can defend: a range, its assumptions, and how much to commit. Two weeks, fixed scope.
30 minutes. No deck, no obligation.
- Built on a panel of 2,886 model SKUs over 35 months
- 43% of finance leaders can’t produce that number — CloudZero, Jun 2026, N=260, over half CFOs
AI Price Index · Sep 2023 – Jul 2026
Index · 100 = Sep 2023 · log scale
| Month | Matched-SKU index (100 = Sep 2023) | Quality-adjusted index, 5× per year (100 = Sep 2023) | Quality-adjusted index, 10× per year (100 = Sep 2023) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sep 2023 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Oct 2023 | 100 | 87.4 | 82.5 |
| Nov 2023 | 99.9 | 76.5 | 68.1 |
| Dec 2023 | 99.9 | 66.9 | 56.2 |
| Jan 2024 | 99.9 | 58.5 | 46.4 |
| Feb 2024 | 99.9 | 51.1 | 38.3 |
| Mar 2024 | 99.8 | 44.7 | 31.6 |
| Apr 2024 | 99.8 | 39.1 | 26.1 |
| May 2024 | 99.8 | 34.2 | 21.5 |
| Jun 2024 | 99.8 | 29.9 | 17.8 |
| Jul 2024 | 99.7 | 26.2 | 14.7 |
| Aug 2024 | 99.7 | 22.9 | 12.1 |
| Sep 2024 | 99.7 | 20 | 10 |
| Oct 2024 | 99.7 | 17.5 | 8.25 |
| Nov 2024 | 99.7 | 15.3 | 6.81 |
| Dec 2024 | 99.6 | 13.4 | 5.62 |
| Jan 2025 | 99.6 | 11.7 | 4.64 |
| Feb 2025 | 99.6 | 10.2 | 3.83 |
| Mar 2025 | 99.6 | 8.94 | 3.16 |
| Apr 2025 | 99.5 | 7.82 | 2.61 |
| May 2025 | 99.5 | 6.84 | 2.15 |
| Jun 2025 | 99.5 | 5.98 | 1.78 |
| Jul 2025 | 99.5 | 5.23 | 1.47 |
| Aug 2025 | 99.4 | 4.57 | 1.21 |
| Sep 2025 | 99.4 | 4 | 1 |
| Oct 2025 | 99.4 | 3.5 | 0.825 |
| Nov 2025 | 99.4 | 3.06 | 0.681 |
| Dec 2025 | 99.3 | 2.67 | 0.562 |
| Jan 2026 | 99.3 | 2.34 | 0.464 |
| Feb 2026 | 99.3 | 2.05 | 0.383 |
| Mar 2026 | 99.3 | 1.79 | 0.316 |
| Apr 2026 | 99.2 | 1.56 | 0.261 |
| May 2026 | 99.2 | 1.37 | 0.215 |
| Jun 2026 | 99.2 | 1.2 | 0.178 |
| Jul 2026 | 99.2 | 1.05 | 0.147 |
The models you already run barely reprice. What falls is the price of models you’d have to switch to.
Method and sources
Repricing is rare — a dated jump, not a trend: 0.82% of model-months carry a list-price change, and 42% of the changes that do occur are increases.
Matched SKUs — measured. Within-model price trend ≈ −0.3%/year, statistically indistinguishable from zero (Demirer, Fradkin, Tadelis & Peng, NBER WP 34608). Our panel of 2,886 model SKUs over 35 months shows the same rigidity from the other side: a live SKU keeps its price in 99.2% of months.
Quality-adjusted — measured, published, not ours. The cost of a fixed capability level falls 5–10× per year (Gundlach et al., arXiv:2511.23455); the band is that published range compounded across the window. A second estimate puts the median near 50× per year (Cottier, Snodin, Owen & Adamczewski, Epoch AI, 12 Mar 2025) — we chart the conservative one. The vertical axis is logarithmic: the two series span three orders of magnitude.
Every other budget line this size answers four standard questions. The AI line answers none of them.
Q1 What should our AI actually cost next year?
Run-rate times a multiple assumes spend arrives smoothly. Supermarkets forecast milk; airlines forecast landing gear — AI spend behaves like landing gear.
11%
Mavvrik/Benchmarkit, N=396, 2026
What we deliver against this
Cloud is smooth because a server-hour is consumed every hour whether anyone shows up. AI spend is decided — someone chooses to start an agent — so it arrives in bursts of wildly different size.
Croston, and the Syntetos–Boylan refinement of it, are the published methods other industries use once demand stops arriving smoothly and starts showing up in occasional bursts of variable size — landing gear, not milk. Whether AI spend formally fits that same shape is untested: nobody, including us, has run the numbers on real AI usage.
So the deliverable isn’t a better trend line. It’s a range with named assumptions, and how much of it to commit forward versus leave on pay-as-you-go.
Q2 How much of what we bought is used effectively?
No tool measures whether what you bought got used, on any customer, industry-wide. AI capacity is sold seven incompatible ways, and even a retry loop counts as real work on a bill.
$250,000
Shutterstock’s CTO, CIO Dive, 11 Jun 2026
What we deliver against this
Layer one: was it consumed at all? Commits, expiring credit pools, and per-seat allowances all get billed as spend whether or not anyone uses them. Gas markets have a whole function that checks whether a buyer consumed what it committed to; AI billing has none, so a credit pool expires unused on one team while another pays overage the same month.
Layer two: was the consumption productive? An agent retry loop, a wrong-model default, and a debugging spiral all draw down the same balance as work that shipped — waste and necessary iteration are the same event in billing data. One vendor survey puts the waste share at roughly 1 in 4 AI dollars (Harness, Jul 2026, N=700) — a vendor’s own estimate, not something anyone has measured on their own spend.
So the deliverable is a consumed-versus-bought figure for every instrument you hold — what each commit, credit pool and seat allowance was billed for against what was actually drawn down — and the same period split into work that shipped versus retries. Nobody has published that ratio on real spend. The first company measured gets the first one.
Q3 What did we get back for it?
Nobody can fully answer this today, including us. Only 22% of finance leaders can tie AI spend to business results; 87% say they must within a year.
CloudZero, Jun 2026, N=260, over half CFOs
What we deliver against this
Outcome-per-spend requires observing the work an AI dollar produced, and no invoice, dashboard, or usage report captures that — only the spend. It’s a structural, industry-wide gap, not a discipline problem any one team can solve alone.
Here’s the path: measure the work inside the agent loop, the only place it’s observable — not the invoice.
Q4 When the bill moves — which of these can we actually change?
The variance commentary today is one line — “we went over on AI” — with no split between vendor repricing, model migration, more users, heavier users, or an agent retry loop, and no one-time-vs-recurring classification.
What we deliver against this
A bill identifies price × work delivered as one number, never the two separately. Price is printed; capability per token is not.
Three tiers sit between a model and your bill, and only the last one is yours. The people who make these models set a list price. The people who sell them to you — a cloud reseller, or the tool your developers actually open — set what you are charged per, the markup on it, and often which model runs by default. They can change any of that in a month when no list price moved at all. Your own teams set how much gets used.
A vendor-or-us split has nowhere to put that middle tier, so it charges the whole amount to your teams and the variance report points at the wrong door.
There’s a second gap under the three tiers: nothing classifies a change as one-time or likely-to-continue — the split the audit committee already requires for every other material variance. Absent a timestamp on the work itself, a deliberate optimization and a silent quality regression are the same event in the billing data.
The decomposition — price, volume, mix, and capability — split out individually, tagged with which tier moved it and whether the move is one-time or likely to continue. Provable from any billing export, not a survey stat.
Not a tooling gap. Every answer above needs to see the work an AI dollar produced, and the bill only ever shows the bill.
The one lever that works without it is a cap. Amazon, Cisco, and Meta all capped AI spend in Q2 2026.
FT, 19 Jun 2026
A cap stops the bleeding — and stops the work along with it.
What you see in week two
Five screens, built from one billing export and your contract terms.
Every figure is a worked example, not customer data, and the arithmetic ties.
Today
IllustrativeWhat your billing dashboard shows
$4.20M
FY26 AI spend · all vendors · up 75% on FY25
Monthly, FY26
One total, trending up. It cannot say how much of the rise came from the people who make these models, the people who sell them to you, or your own teams — so it cannot tell you what to commit for FY27.
Week two
IllustrativeWhat you sign off on
FY25 $2.40M → FY26 $4.20M, by driver and by who moved it
Price
who makes it
Capability
who makes it
Billing unit and margin
who you buy from
Volume
who uses it
Mix
who uses it
who makes it
−$0.28M
who you buy from
+$0.24M
who uses it
+$1.84M
The line you sign
Commit $4.20M. Leave $1.90M on pay-as-you-go.
Against an FY27 P50 of $6.10M and a P90 of $8.40M.
01The band
01 · The band
IllustrativeFY27 as a range, with a floor and a ceiling
Three vendor price scenarios against one demand model. You budget the P50 and you carry the P90 as the number you could survive.
Vendor prices hold
matched SKUs flat — the central case
Matched prices fall 10%
every SKU you run today reprices down
Matched prices rise 8%
the case nobody budgets for
Axis starts at $4.00M. The faint vertical line is FY26 actual, $4.20M.
Illustrative figures — a worked example, not customer data.
02The decomposition
02 · The decomposition
IllustrativeLast year’s movement, split by who moved it
Three tiers, not two: the people who make these models, the people who sell them to you, and your own teams. The middle one is the one a bill hides.
who makes it
−$0.28M
who you buy from
+$0.24M
who uses it
+$1.84M
Total movement
+$1.80M
Solid bars add, outlined bars subtract. $2.40M +$1.80M = $4.20M.
Illustrative figures — a worked example, not customer data.
03The two failure modes
03 · The two failure modes
IllustrativeBoth of the ways a commit goes wrong
Always shown as a pair. One number alone invites “we’ll just cap it” — the pair shows that a cap only picks the other failure.
If you commit the ceiling
$2.30M
stranded — bought and never used
Commit the P90 of $8.40M, land on the P50 of $6.10M, and the difference expires with the contract year.
If you commit nothing
$1.68M
exposed — used and overpaid for
Every unit at pay-as-you-go. Land on the P90 of $8.40M and you pay the full 20% you could have contracted away.
Cap the first number and you buy the second. That is why the answer is a commit level, not a cap.
Illustrative figures — a worked example, not customer data.
04The commit decision
04 · The commit decision
IllustrativeCommit $4.20M at the annual tier with Vendor A. Leave $1.90M on pay-as-you-go.
The deliverable with money attached.
Committed
$4.20MPay-as-you-go
$1.90M- Commit — Vendor A, annual tier20% below pay-as-you-go, per your clause 4.2
- $4.20M
- Pay-as-you-go — all vendorsthe rest of the P50 of $6.10M
- $1.90M
- Stranded risk at the P10the commit sits below the P10 demand of $4.90M
- $0.00M
- Saved against no commit20% of $4.20M
- $0.84M
$4.20M + $1.90M = $6.10M, the P50 of the central scenario on screen 01.
The commit number above is also the budget number — they’re one figure, not two decisions. Below it, the next unit of usage costs nothing extra, so what you commit changes what teams actually use. That’s why a bigger commit isn’t automatically the safer one.
Illustrative figures — a worked example, not customer data.
05The assumption register
05 · The assumption register
IllustrativeEvery driver, its source, and what it moves
What your audit committee asks for.
| Driver | FY27 assumption | Source | Moves the P50 by |
|---|---|---|---|
| Seats on AI tools | 340 → 470 by Q4 | your FY27 hiring plan, approved 12 Jun | ±$0.62M |
| Runs per seat, per month | 84 → 128 | your billing export, 14 months | ±$0.94M |
| Matched-SKU price change | 0% — held flat | our panel: 2,886 model SKUs, 35 months | −$0.50M at −10% · +$0.45M at +8% |
| Share of runs on the frontier tier | 62% — held at today’s level | your last 3 months, by model | ±$0.38M |
| Work delivered per unit of spend | +12% a year | matched-task evaluations, published | ±$0.33M |
| Committed rate vs pay-as-you-go | 20% below list | your current contract, clause 4.2 | $0.84M at the recommended commit |
Disagree with any row and the number moves. That is the product.
Sensitivities move one driver at a time. The band on screen 01 moves them together, so these do not sum to it.
Illustrative figures — a worked example, not customer data.
How it works
One billing export + your contract terms
(a two-hour ask for your team, not a project)
Two weeks, fixed scope.
A number you can defend in the September challenge session — and how much of it to commit.
30 minutes. No deck, no obligation.
Why now
AI spend stopped being people typing prompts. Software runs the loop now, and it doesn’t tire — up 18.6× per developer in nine months (Jellyfish).
Your FY27 calendar
≈54 days out
September challenge sessions
Where your number gets questioned.
≈69 days out
October board preview
After this, no material rewrites.
≈115 days out
November 30 — FY27 locks
The number stops being editable.
Whatever survives the October board preview is what you live with through 2027. A commit signed against it is contractual. To be useful before September, we start in August.
We have no customers yet. We have the panel.
unerr is a research lab at the intersection of finance and applied AI.
2,886 SKUs
Our panel: 2,886 model SKUs, 35 months
99.2%
Our panel: 2,886 model SKUs, 35 months
42%
Our panel: 2,886 model SKUs, 35 months
~80%
Our panel: 2,886 model SKUs, 35 months
Independent replication: Demirer, Fradkin, Tadelis & Peng, NBER WP 34608 find ~85% on an unrelated dataset.
Fixed scope, two weeks, one ask.
Here’s exactly what starting requires from your side.
Scope
- Fixed. Not a subscription, not an open-ended retainer.
Timeline
- Two weeks, start to the number you defend in your next board session.
What we need
- One billing export at model granularity, plus your current contract terms. That’s the only ask.
December fiscal-year-end companies only — that’s not gatekeeping, it’s the calendar: if your year ends in June, your window already closed.
Questions we get before the call
Answered here so they don’t slow down the call.
We already have CloudZero, Vantage, or a FinOps team.
Good — clean history makes this faster. Those tools project month-end on trajectory; we produce an annual range, a split showing whether the move came from the people who make the models, the people who sell them to you, or your own teams, and the commit decision — a different question.
Isn’t AI getting cheaper anyway?
The models you already run barely reprice — across our panel of 2,886 model SKUs over 35 months, a live SKU keeps its price in 99.2% of months, 42% of the changes that do occur are increases, and about 80% of the apparent market decline is new models entering, not existing models repricing. Demirer, Fradkin, Tadelis & Peng (NBER WP 34608) independently find close to 85% on an unrelated dataset — the same conclusion, twice. What falls is the price of models you’d have to switch to — switching is a decision, not a discount.
Can’t we just set a cap?
A cap isn’t an answer to the audit committee’s question about assumptions — it stops the number moving without saying whether the move was one-time or likely to continue, the classification they already require for every material variance.
Can’t we just do this in a spreadsheet?
A bill identifies price × work delivered as one number, never the two separately. Price is printed; capability per token is not. A spreadsheet restates what’s on the invoice — it can’t separate a vendor price change from your own consumption change, because that split needs an external measure of work delivered per token, which no invoice carries.
What if you’re wrong?
We give a range with a named assumption register, not a point estimate. Disagree with any driver and the model updates — that’s the product.
Book 30 minutes.
Two weeks, fixed scope — before your FY27 number locks.
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